To more rigorously describe what is involved in understanding truth and defining it, Alfred Tarski created his Semantic Theory of Truth. The Semantic Theory is the successor to the Correspondence Theory.
Line 1 is about truth. Line 3 is not about truth — it asserts a claim about the nature of the world. Thus T makes a substantive claim. There are, we see, sentences in two distinct languages involved in this T-proposition. If, however, we switch the inner, or quoted sentence, to an English sentence, e.
In this latter case, it looks as if only one language English , not two, is involved in expressing the T-proposition. Tarski discovered that in order to avoid contradiction in his semantic theory of truth, he had to restrict the object language to a limited portion of the metalanguage. Also, Tarski wants his truth theory to reveal the logical structure within propositions that permits valid reasoning to preserve truth.
To do all this, the theory must work for more complex propositions by showing how the truth-values of these complex propositions depend on their parts, such as the truth-values of their constituent propositions. Truth tables show how this is done for the simple language of Propositional Logic e. He wants what we today call a model theory for quantified predicate logic.
His actual theory is very technical. At the second stage, his theory shows how the truth predicate, when it has been defined for propositions expressed by sentences of a certain degree of grammatical complexity, can be defined for propositions of the next greater degree of complexity. According to Tarski, his theory applies only to artificial languages — in particular, the classical formal languages of symbolic logic — because our natural languages are vague and unsystematic.
Other philosophers — for example, Donald Davidson — have not been as pessimistic as Tarski about analyzing truth for natural languages. Doing so, he says, provides at the same time the central ingredient of a theory of meaning for the language. Davidson develops the original idea Frege stated in his Basic Laws of Arithmetic that the meaning of a declarative sentence is given by certain conditions under which it is true—that meaning is given by truth conditions. Each of these research areas contains its own intriguing problems.
All must overcome the difficulties involved with ambiguity, tenses, and indexical phrases. Many philosophers divide the class of propositions into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subclasses: namely, propositions that are contingent that is, those that are neither necessarily-true nor necessarily-false and those that are noncontingent that is, those that are necessarily-true or necessarily-false.
On the Semantic Theory of Truth, contingent propositions are those that are true or false because of some specific way the world happens to be. For example all of the following propositions are contingent :. The contrasting class of propositions comprises those whose truth or falsehood, as the case may be is dependent, according to the Semantic Theory, not on some specific way the world happens to be, but on any way the world happens to be.
Imagine the world changed however you like provided, of course, that its description remains logically consistent [i. Even under those conditions, the truth-values of the following noncontingent propositions will remain unchanged:. However, some philosophers who accept the Semantic Theory of Truth for contingent propositions, reject it for noncontingent ones. They have argued that the truth of noncontingent propositions has a different basis from the truth of contingent ones. The truth of noncontingent propositions comes about, they say — not through their correctly describing the way the world is — but as a matter of the definitions of terms occurring in the sentences expressing those propositions.
Noncontingent truths, on this account, are said to be true by definition , or — as it is sometimes said, in a variation of this theme — as a matter of conceptual relationships between the concepts at play within the propositions, or — yet another kindred way — as a matter of the meanings of the sentences expressing the propositions. It is apparent, in this competing account, that one is invoking a kind of theory of linguistic truth.
In this alternative theory, truth for a certain class of propositions, namely the class of noncontingent propositions, is to be accounted for — not in their describing the way the world is, but rather — because of certain features of our human linguistic constructs.
Does the Semantic Theory need to be supplemented in this manner? If one were to adopt the Semantic Theory of Truth, would one also need to adopt a complementary theory of truth, namely, a theory of linguistic truth for noncontingent propositions? Or, can the Semantic Theory of Truth be used to explain the truth-values of all propositions, the contingent and noncontingent alike?
If so, how? To see how one can argue that the Semantic Theory of Truth can be used to explicate the truth of noncontingent propositions, consider the following series of propositions, the first four of which are contingent, the fifth of which is noncontingent:. Each of these propositions, as we move from the second to the fifth, is slightly less specific than its predecessor. Each can be regarded as being true under a greater range of variation or circumstances than its predecessor.
When we reach the fifth member of the series we have a proposition that is true under any and all sets of circumstances. On this view, what distinguishes noncontingent truths from contingent ones is not that their truth arises as a consequence of facts about our language or of meanings, etc.
Contingent propositions are true in some, but not all, possible circumstances or possible worlds. Noncontingent propositions, in contrast, are true in all possible circumstances or in none. There is no difference as to the nature of truth for the two classes of propositions, only in the ranges of possibilities in which the propositions are true. An adherent of the Semantic Theory will allow that there is, to be sure, a powerful insight in the theories of linguistic truth.
But, they will counter, these linguistic theories are really shedding no light on the nature of truth itself. Rather, they are calling attention to how we often go about ascertaining the truth of noncontingent propositions. While it is certainly possible to ascertain the truth experientially and inductively of the noncontingent proposition that all aunts are females — for example, one could knock on a great many doors asking if any of the residents were aunts and if so, whether they were female — it would be a needless exercise.
We need not examine the world carefully to figure out the truth-value of the proposition that all aunts are females. We might, for example, simply consult an English dictionary. How we ascertain , find out , determine the truth-values of noncontingent propositions may but need not invariably be by nonexperiential means; but from that it does not follow that the nature of truth of noncontingent propositions is fundamentally different from that of contingent ones.
On this latter view, the Semantic Theory of Truth is adequate for both contingent propositions and noncontingent ones. In neither case is the Semantic Theory of Truth intended to be a theory of how we might go about finding out what the truth-value is of any specified proposition. Indeed, one very important consequence of the Semantic Theory of Truth is that it allows for the existence of propositions whose truth-values are in principle unknowable to human beings.
And there is a second motivation for promoting the Semantic Theory of Truth for noncontingent propositions. How is it that mathematics is able to be used in concert with physical theories to explain the nature of the world? On the Semantic Theory, the answer is that the noncontingent truths of mathematics correctly describe the world as they would any and every possible world. The Linguistic Theory, which makes the truth of the noncontingent truths of mathematics arise out of features of language, is usually thought to have great, if not insurmountable, difficulties in grappling with this question.
The Correspondence Theory and the Semantic Theory account for the truth of a proposition as arising out of a relationship between that proposition and features or events in the world. Coherence Theories of which there are a number , in contrast, account for the truth of a proposition as arising out of a relationship between that proposition and other propositions. Coherence Theories are valuable because they help to reveal how we arrive at our truth claims, our knowledge.
We continually work at fitting our beliefs together into a coherent system. The major coherence theories view coherence as requiring at least logical consistency. Coherence Theories have their critics too. The proposition that bismuth has a higher melting point than tin may cohere with my beliefs but not with your beliefs.
Most philosophers prefer to preserve the law of non-contradiction over any theory of truth that requires rejecting it.
A second difficulty with Coherence Theories is that the beliefs of any one person or of any group are invariably self-contradictory. Thus most propositions, by failing to cohere, will not have truth-values.
This result violates the law of the excluded middle. And there is a third objection. A fourth objection is that Coherence theories focus on the nature of verifiability and not truth. In recent years, one particular Coherence Theory has attracted a lot of attention and some considerable heat and fury. Although everyone would agree that influential people — the movers and shakers — have profound effects upon the beliefs of other persons, the controversy revolves around whether the acceptance by others of their beliefs is wholly a matter of their personal or institutional prominence.
Or, to put it another way, to the extent that there is an objective reality it is nothing more nor less than what we say it is. We human beings are, then, the ultimate arbiters of what is true. Consensus is truth.
These postmodernist views have received a more sympathetic reception among social scientists than among physical scientists. In contrast, physical scientists are — for the most part — rather unwilling to regard propositions in their own field as somehow merely the product of consensus among eminent physical scientists.
They are inclined to believe that the proposition that protons are composed of three quarks is true or false depending on whether or not it accurately describes an objective reality. They are disinclined to believe that the truth of such a proposition arises out of the pronouncements of eminent physical scientists. In short, physical scientists do not believe that prestige and social influence trump reality.
Our ancestors did themselves and us a great favour when they began using noises to communicate. We could use it to describe the world as we found it; but we could also use it to create things, such as boundaries and private property. As John Searle has argued, the vast structure of our social world, including our laws, businesses, politics, economics and entertainments, has been built out of language. Telling the truth is just one of the uses of language.
Telling the truth is complicated by the fact that we live in a hybrid world, partly natural, partly invented.
Another complication is that we ourselves are physical objects which can be described using objective terms, but we are also social beings, in roles, relationships and structures which are all man-made. Classifications are a key component of language.
Some classifications are givens in nature the periodic table, biological taxonomy, physical laws while others are inventions social roles, types uses of furniture, parts of speech. In their search for truth the natural sciences seek to discover natural classifications, as distinct from social inventions. True descriptions are like maps. Some descriptions map objective reality, as the natural sciences do, which is like a map of physical contours.
Other descriptions map our socially-constructed world, as journalists, historians, novelists and theologians do, like a map showing political borders. We have made great progress since our ancestors first grunted at each other. I would like to say that truth exists outside of us, for all to see. Unfortunately, humans can be stubborn, and so the actual pinning down of what a truth is is more complicated.
Society plays host to two types of truths; subjective truth and objective truth. Objective truth is discovered by a search which is critical of our experiences until sufficient evidence has been gathered. Our preference as a society is, I believe, revealed through our use of language.
It is true from our individual standpoint, but it is not a truth in the objective sense. The truth, in an objective sense, is that we live on a planet which spins on its axis and it orbits the Sun. Based on our use of language in the majority of situations, an alien may then well judge us to be very ignorant, and that our truth is self-serving.
Everyone knows perfectly well what truth is — everyone except Pontius Pilate and philosophers. Truth is the quality of being true, and being true is what some statements are. That is to say, truth is a quality of the propositions which underlie correctly-used statements. What does that mean? Nonetheless, it is perfectly natural to say that a statement itself is true; people who think this would say that the above statement, as uttered by the man who thinks Gordon Brown is PM, is false even though what he meant by it is true.
However, to generalise, it is not really the statement itself that is true or false , but what is meant by it. I dilute my solution, place it into a cuvette, and take a reading with the spectrophotometer: 0.
I repeat the procedure once more and get 0. From this I get the average of 0. The variation is probably based upon tiny inconsistencies in how I am handling the equipment, so three readings should be sufficient for my purposes. Have I discovered the truth? Well yes — I have a measurement that seems roughly consistent, and should, assuming that my notes are complete and my spectrophotometer has been calibrated, be repeatable in many other labs around the world.
The spectrophotometer is set at nm, which — so I have been taught — is the wavelength used to measure protein concentration. So my experiment has determined the truth of how much protein is in the cuvette. But again, a wider context is needed. What is a protein, how do spectrophotometers work, what is albumin, why do I want to know the concentration in the first place? Observations are great, but really rather pointless without a reason to make them, and without the theoretical knowledge for how to interpret them.
Truth, even in science, is therefore highly contextual. This seemingly subtle reorientation created a profound change, however. The world would now be seen through scientific eyes. The right to determine truth would be pulled down from the heavens and handed over to the inductive, quantitative realm of science.
This empirical approach lies at the core of our thinking today. Equipped with the new tools of science, humans aspired to revolutionize the world. What followed, in fact, was a series of revolutions and explorations, and the subsequent conquest of the planet. The new approach was applied and adapted to all areas of life. Modern society, beginning with the Scientific Revolution and on into the Age of Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, was built on a foundation of science and the technology that resulted from it, with the invisible hand of capitalism financing its inexorable rise.
As tools of and by themselves, they proved effective in advancing knowledge of the physical realm, but as a foundation for all truth, they were deficient. Because universally acclaimed truth was no longer available to bind us, we became disconnected from one another. We drifted into the meaninglessness from which we once sought refuge.
Following Hegel and Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche , the last of the three great German philosophers of the 19 th century, came along and made the definitive statement that set the stage for what was to follow. Contemptuous of those who had tried to secularize morality by divorcing it from Christianity, Nietzsche pronounced God dead.
This meant the death of truth—in particular, the truth of any authority beyond the self. By the beginning of the 20 th century, his nihilistic thinking began to weave its way into the fabric of society. What was once thought of as incomprehensible and absurd, even offensive, became widely accepted.
The idea of natural selection placed man within a linear, or progressive, model of development; in other words, any change that was responsive to current thoughts and trends had to be positive. Therefore the ground was always shifting.
Justification for our beliefs, now in our own hands, was given substance by nothing more tangible than our feelings and personal gratification. Separated from our foundations and lost, humanity has been groping for truth ever since.
The modern world searched for truth scientifically. Modernism possessed a confident worldview. Believing that nothing exists beyond what our senses can perceive, modernists determined truth as they experienced it. Modernism, with its unconditional belief in objective reality, saw truth as the result of statements that could be either proved or disproved.
This idea that we alone can determine reality and truth has made truth self-legitimizing. However, although it sounds inspiring and appeals to our basic human nature, it is not a reliable formula by which to determine all truth. The applied science of technology was supposed to be the 20 th -century messiah, but for many it appears to have exhausted its potential in that it has not, as Francis Bacon wished, improved the human condition.
But instead of going back to the basics and rethinking our premises, we now say that no one is right and everyone is right. This is relativism of the most brazen sort. With a loss of confidence, we see the world as a by-product of many realities and many truths. Everything is possible and nothing is certain. Truth is a story. This reaction to the overconfident stance of modernism is the essence of post modernism.
Consequently, relativism itself may be true and false. The coherence theory is typically associated with idealism. As we have already discussed, forms of it were held by British idealists such as Joachim, and later by Blanshard in America. An idealist should see the last step in the justification argument as quite natural. More generally, an idealist will see little if any room between a system of beliefs and the world it is about, leaving the coherence theory of truth as an extremely natural option.
It is possible to be an idealist without adopting a coherence theory. For instance, many scholars read Bradley as holding a version of the identity theory of truth. See Baldwin for some discussion. However, it is hard to see much of a way to hold the coherence theory of truth without maintaining some form of idealism.
Walker argues that every coherence theorist must be an idealist, but not vice-versa. The neo-classical correspondence theory seeks to capture the intuition that truth is a content-to-world relation. It captures this in the most straightforward way, by asking for an object in the world to pair up with a true proposition.
The neo-classical coherence theory, in contrast, insists that truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or belief-to-belief, relation.
The coherence theory requires some metaphysics which can make the world somehow reflect this, and idealism appears to be it. A distant descendant of the neo-classical coherence theory that does not require idealism will be discussed in section 6. For more on the coherence theory, see Walker and the entry on the coherence theory of truth.
A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans.
For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:. See, for instance Hartshorne et al. Both Peirce and James are associated with the slogan that:. James e. True beliefs are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. See Misak for an extended discussion. This marks an important difference between the pragmatist theories and the coherence theory we just considered. Even so, pragmatist theories also have an affinity with coherence theories, insofar as we expect the end of inquiry to be a coherent system of beliefs.
As Haack also notes, James maintains an important verificationist idea: truth is what is verifiable. We will see this idea re-appear in section 4. For more on pragmatist theories of truth, see Misak Modern forms of the classical theories survive.
Many of these modern theories, notably correspondence theories, draw on ideas developed by Tarski. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that his seminal work on truth is very much of a piece with other works in mathematical logic, such as his , and as much as anything this work lays the ground-work for the modern subject of model theory — a branch of mathematical logic, not the metaphysics of truth.
In the classical debate on truth at the beginning of the 20th century we considered in section 1, the issue of truth-bearers was of great significance. Many theories we reviewed took beliefs to be the bearers of truth. In contrast, Tarski and much of the subsequent work on truth takes sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. But whereas much of the classical debate takes the issue of the primary bearers of truth to be a substantial and important metaphysical one, Tarski is quite casual about it.
His primary reason for taking sentences as truth-bearers is convenience, and he explicitly distances himself from any commitment about the philosophically contentious issues surrounding other candidate truth-bearers e.
We will return to the issue of the primary bearers of truth in section 6. But it should be stressed that for this discussion, sentences are fully interpreted sentences, having meanings. We will also assume that the sentences in question do not change their content across occasions of use, i.
In some places e. This is an adequacy condition for theories, not a theory itself. In light of this, Convention T guarantees that the truth predicate given by the theory will be extensionally correct , i. Tarski does not merely propose a condition of adequacy for theories of truth, he also shows how to meet it.
But truth can be defined for all of them by recursion. This may look trivial, but in defining an extensionally correct truth predicate for an infinite language with four clauses, we have made a modest application of a very powerful technique. They do not stop with atomic sentences. Tarski notes that truth for each atomic sentence can be defined in terms of two closely related notions: reference and satisfaction. Tarski goes on to demonstrate some key applications of such a theory of truth.
This was especially important to Tarski, who was concerned the Liar paradox would make theories in languages containing a truth predicate inconsistent. The correspondence theory of truth expresses the very natural idea that truth is a content-to-world or word-to-world relation: what we say or think is true or false in virtue of the way the world turns out to be.
We suggested that, against a background like the metaphysics of facts, it does so in a straightforward way. But the idea of correspondence is certainly not specific to this framework. Indeed, it is controversial whether a correspondence theory should rely on any particular metaphysics at all. Yet without the metaphysics of facts, the notion of correspondence as discussed in section 1.
This has led to two distinct strands in contemporary thinking about the correspondence theory. One strand seeks to recast the correspondence theory in a way that does not rely on any particular ontology. Another seeks to find an appropriate ontology for correspondence, either in terms of facts or other entities. We will consider each in turn. Tarski himself sometimes suggested that his theory was a kind of correspondence theory of truth.
Whether his own theory is a correspondence theory, and even whether it provides any substantial philosophical account of truth at all, is a matter of controversy. One rather drastic negative assessment from Putnam —86, p. As it is normally understood, reference is the preeminent word-to-world relation. Satisfaction is naturally understood as a word-to-world relation as well, which relates a predicate to the things in the world that bear it.
The Tarskian recursive definition shows how truth is determined by reference and satisfaction, and so is in effect determined by the things in the world we refer to and the properties they bear.
This, one might propose, is all the correspondence we need. It is not correspondence of sentences or propositions to facts; rather, it is correspondence of our expressions to objects and the properties they bear, and then ways of working out the truth of claims in terms of this.
This is certainly not the neo-classical idea of correspondence. In not positing facts, it does not posit any single object to which a true proposition or sentence might correspond. Rather, it shows how truth might be worked out from basic word-to-world relations. As we will discuss more fully in section 4.
Rather, it offers a number of disquotation clauses , such as:. These clauses have an air of triviality though whether they are to be understood as trivial principles or statements of non-trivial semantic facts has been a matter of some debate.
With Field, we might propose to supplement clauses like these with an account of reference and satisfaction. In , Field was envisaging a physicalist account, along the lines of the causal theory of reference.
This should inter alia guarantee that truth is really determined by word-to-world relations, so in conjunction with the Tarskian recursive definition, it could provide a correspondence theory of truth. Such a theory clearly does not rely on a metaphysics of facts.
Indeed, it is in many ways metaphysically neutral, as it does not take a stand on the nature of particulars, or of the properties or universals that underwrite facts about satisfaction. However, it may not be entirely devoid of metaphysical implications, as we will discuss further in section 4.
Much of the subsequent discussion of Field-style approaches to correspondence has focused on the role of representation in these views.
These are instances of representation relations. According to representational views, meaningful items, like perhaps thoughts or sentences or their constituents, have their contents in virtue of standing in the right relation to the things they represent.
The project of developing a naturalist account of the representation relation has been an important one in the philosophy of mind and language. See the entry on mental representation. But, it has implications for the theory of truth. Representational views of content lead naturally to correspondence theories of truth. To make this vivid, suppose you hold that sentences or beliefs stand in a representation relation to some objects. It is natural to suppose that for true beliefs or sentences, those objects would be facts.
We then have a correspondence theory, with the correspondence relation explicated as a representation relation: a truth bearer is true if it represents a fact. As we have discussed, many contemporary views reject facts, but one can hold a representational view of content without them. The relations of reference and satisfaction are representation relations, and truth for sentences is determined compositionally in terms of those representation relations, and the nature of the objects they represent.
If we have such relations, we have the building blocks for a correspondence theory without facts. Field anticipated a naturalist reduction of the representation via a causal theory, but any view that accepts representation relations for truth bearers or their constituents can provide a similar theory of truth. See Jackson and Lynch for further discussion. Representational views of content provide a natural way to approach the correspondence theory of truth, and likewise, anti-representational views provide a natural way to avoid the correspondence theory of truth.
This is most clear in the work of Davidson, as we will discuss more in section 6. There have been a number of correspondence theories that do make use of facts. Some are notably different from the neo-classical theory sketched in section 1. For instance, Austin proposes a view in which each statement understood roughly as an utterance event corresponds to both a fact or situation, and a type of situation.
It is true if the former is of the latter type. This theory, which has been developed by situation theory e. Rather, correspondence relations to Austin are entirely conventional. See Vision for an extended defense of an Austinian correspondence theory. As an ordinary language philosopher, Austin grounds his notion of fact more in linguistic usage than in an articulated metaphysics, but he defends his use of fact-talk in Austin b. In a somewhat more Tarskian spirit, formal theories of facts or states of affairs have also been developed.
There are more metaphysically robust notions of fact in the current literature. The view has much in common with the neo-classical one. Like the neo-classical view, Armstrong endorses a version of the correspondence theory. States of affairs are truthmakers for propositions, though Armstrong argues that there may be many such truthmakers for a given proposition, and vice versa.
Armstrong also envisages a naturalistic account of propositions as classes of equivalent belief-tokens. It is then argued that facts are the appropriate truthmakers. In contrast to the approach to correspondence discussed in section 3. The truthmaker principle expresses the ontological aspect of the neo-classical correspondence theory. Not merely must truth obtain in virtue of word-to-world relations, but there must be a thing that makes each truth true.
For one view on this, see Merricks The neo-classical correspondence theory, and Armstrong, cast facts as the appropriate truthmakers. However, it is a non-trivial step from the truthmaker principle to the existence of facts. Parsons argues that the truthmaker principle presented in a somewhat different form is compatible with there being only concrete particulars. As we saw in discussing the neo-classical correspondence theory, truthmaker theories, and fact theories in particular, raise a number of issues.
One which has been discussed at length, for instance, is whether there are negative facts. Negative facts would be the truthmakers for negated sentences. Russell notoriously expresses ambivalence about whether there are negative facts. Armstrong rejects them, while Beall defends them. For more discussion of truthmakers, see Cameron and the papers in Beebee and Dodd The neo-classical theories we surveyed in section 1 made the theory of truth an application of their background metaphysics and in some cases epistemology.
In section 2 and especially in section 3, we returned to the issue of what sorts of ontological commitments might go with the theory of truth. There we saw a range of options, from relatively ontologically non-committal theories, to theories requiring highly specific ontologies. There is another way in which truth relates to metaphysics. Many ideas about realism and anti-realism are closely related to ideas about truth.
Indeed, many approaches to questions about realism and anti-realism simply make them questions about truth. In discussing the approach to correspondence of section 3. It relies on there being objects of reference, and something about the world which makes for determinate satisfaction relations; but beyond that, it is ontologically neutral. But as we mentioned there, this is not to say that it has no metaphysical implications.
A correspondence theory of truth, of any kind, is often taken to embody a form of realism. Wright offers a nice statement of this way of thinking about realism.
These theses imply that our claims are objectively true or false, depending on how the world they are about is. The world that we represent in our thoughts or language is an objective world.
Realism may be restricted to some subject-matter, or range of discourse, but for simplicity, we will talk about only its global form. It is often argued that these theses require some form of the correspondence theory of truth. Putnam , p. Such a theory will provide an account of objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and show how these determine the truth or falsehood of what we say about the world.
But realism is a more general idea than physicalism. Any theory that provides objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and builds up a theory of truth from them, would give a form of realism. Making the objectivity of reference the key to realism is characteristic of work of Putnam, e.
Another important mark of realism expressed in terms of truth is the property of bivalence. As Dummett has stressed e.
Hence, one important mark of realism is that it goes together with the principle of bivalence : every truth-bearer sentence or proposition is true or false. In much of his work, Dummett has made this the characteristic mark of realism, and often identifies realism about some subject-matter with accepting bivalence for discourse about that subject-matter. At the very least, it captures a great deal of what is more loosely put in the statement of realism above.
Both the approaches to realism, through reference and through bivalence, make truth the primary vehicle for an account of realism. A theory of truth which substantiates bivalence, or builds truth from a determinate reference relation, does most of the work of giving a realistic metaphysics. It might even simply be a realistic metaphysics. We have thus turned on its head the relation of truth to metaphysics we saw in our discussion of the neo-classical correspondence theory in section 1.
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